Idaho's Grocery Tax

The Reformer's Record

Robert Smylie entered 1966 as one of the most accomplished governors in Idaho history. After twelve years in office, serving as chairman of both the Western Governors Association and the Republican Governors Association, he was considered a potential vice-presidential candidate for 1968. Time magazine predicted in April 1966 that he was effectively assured of winning an unprecedented fourth term. time.com TIME Magazine "Idaho: An Ironic Defeat" (April 1966) Contemporaneous reporting on Smylie's expected fourth-term victory → time.com [1]

His record justified that confidence. The 1965 legislative session — which Smylie later called "probably the most productive in the history of the state" — had been a tour de force. Beyond the sales tax, that session created Idaho's state parks system, established a statewide junior college system, fully funded the teacher retirement system, built $20 million worth of university buildings, provided initial funding for Boise State University, created a Department of Water Resources, and began the State Capitol Mall. lmtribune.com Lewiston Morning Tribune Review of Governor Smylie Remembers (1998) Details Smylie's memoir account of the 1965 legislative achievements → lmtribune.com [2]

The sales tax was the crown jewel. Idaho schools faced a severe funding crisis in the early 1960s, with overcrowded classrooms and teachers leaving for neighboring states. lmtribune.com Lewiston Morning Tribune "Bob Smylie Really Was the Education Governor" (2004) Bill Hall obituary editorial on Smylie's education legacy → lmtribune.com [3] The tax had failed three previous attempts. Smylie navigated it through the Idaho Senate 26-18 in 1965, packaging it with a $10 per person income tax credit as property tax relief. ktvb.com KTVB (Tegna) "The Story of Sales Tax: Idaho" History of Idaho sales tax adoption and legislative process → ktvb.com [4] The bill created what policy-makers would call Idaho's "three-legged stool" of income, property, and sales taxes. spokesman.com Spokesman-Review Robert Smylie Obituary (2004) Confirms the "three-legged stool" framework for Idaho fiscal policy → spokesman.com [5]

In his 1998 memoir Governor Smylie Remembers, Smylie wrote with undisguised pride: "Enactment of the 1965 sales tax was undoubtedly the most important legislative act of Idaho's (first) 100 years. Its passage marked a defining moment in the state's struggle toward political and economic maturity." lmtribune.com Lewiston Morning Tribune Review of Governor Smylie Remembers (1998) Confirmed verbatim memoir quote on the sales tax's significance → lmtribune.com [2] Yet he acknowledged in the next breath that "his support for the 3-cent tax was probably a major factor in his upset defeat in the Republican primary a year later." spokesman.com Spokesman-Review Robert Smylie Obituary (2004) Confirms Smylie's own acknowledgment that the tax contributed to his defeat → spokesman.com [5]

The Conservative Insurgency

The sales tax was only one blade of the scissors that cut Smylie down. The other was ideology.

In 1964, as Barry Goldwater's conservative movement seized control of the Republican Party, Smylie became one of its most prominent opponents. He publicly backed Nelson Rockefeller for president while, as one account put it, "countless Idaho Republicans were falling in love with the plainspoken Goldwater." eastidahonews.com East Idaho News "Remembering Two of Idaho's Most Decisive Elections" (2025) Comprehensive account of the 1966 primary and referendum → eastidahonews.com [6] Idaho's Goldwater delegates won every convention seat. Smylie received one ceremonial position only after he "promised to do as he was told." The conservatives "sat a loyal Goldwaterite right next to him on the convention floor with orders to grab the mike if Smylie strayed." lmtribune.com Lewiston Morning Tribune Bill Hall Obituary Editorial (2004) Confirms convention floor detail about Goldwaterite monitoring Smylie → lmtribune.com [3]

After Goldwater's catastrophic November loss, Smylie didn't stay quiet. He publicly declared that Goldwater was on the "wrong side of every issue," called the election "one of the biggest losses in the history of the Republican Party," and led the national fight to replace Goldwater's handpicked RNC chairman Dean Burch with moderate Ray Bliss. He urged that Republicans repudiate the John Birch Society. wikipedia.org Wikipedia Robert E. Smylie Biographical article confirming Smylie's anti-Goldwater statements and RNC fight → wikipedia.org [7] In 1964, conservative forces "seized control of the state central committee that Smylie had dominated for ten years." time.com TIME Magazine "Idaho: An Ironic Defeat" (1966) Confirms conservative takeover of Idaho Republican state committee → time.com [1]

Idaho Republican National Committeewoman Gwen Barnett — reportedly a close ally of Goldwater, a friend of Dean Burch, and connected to rising conservative star Senator John Tower — made defeating Smylie her personal cause. She recruited Don Samuelson, a stolid state senator from Sandpoint who sold fire-fighting equipment and rock drills, to challenge the governor. manythingsconsidered.com Many Things Considered (Rick Just) "Idaho's Deja Vu" (2013) Secondary account citing political observer Marty Peterson on Barnett's recruitment role → manythingsconsidered.com [8] In a detail invisible to the historical record until gap-fill research surfaced it, Smylie had himself recruited Samuelson into politics, encouraging him to run for the state senate in 1960. spokesman.com Spokesman-Review Robert Smylie Obituary (2004) Confirms "it was Smylie who recruited Samuelson into politics" → spokesman.com [5] The reformer's nemesis was the reformer's own political protégé.

The Compounding Vulnerabilities

Samuelson's campaign synthesized multiple grievances into a single anti-Smylie coalition. The sales tax gave him a concrete policy grievance that resonated beyond the conservative base. The Goldwater network provided organizational infrastructure. Smylie's twelve years in office fed incumbent fatigue. His personality — "a smarty-pants with a weakness for droll putdowns of adversaries," as one obituary writer put it — had worn thin. lmtribune.com Lewiston Morning Tribune Bill Hall Obituary Editorial (2004) Characterizes Smylie's personal style and its political cost → lmtribune.com [3]

TIME magazine catalogued the damage: Smylie "had naturally gathered a lot of enemies in his three terms," many were "reluctant to give him a fourth term that would make his the longest gubernatorial tenure in U.S. history," and he faced "strong opposition from Idaho's well-entrenched conservatives, who resented his lackluster support of Barry Goldwater in 1964." time.com TIME Magazine "Idaho: An Ironic Defeat" (1966) Contemporaneous analysis of Smylie's compounding political vulnerabilities → time.com [1] Smylie seriously underestimated the threat. He barely acknowledged having an opponent, and a late squabble over whether Goldwater had endorsed him — Goldwater said he hadn't — made the governor look desperate. lmtribune.com Lewiston Morning Tribune David Leroy Op-Ed (2022) Former Idaho AG draws parallel between Smylie-Samuelson and Little-McGeachin primary dynamics → lmtribune.com [9]

On August 2, 1966, Samuelson won 52,891 votes to Smylie's 33,753 — 61% to 39%. wikipedia.org Wikipedia 1966 Idaho Gubernatorial Election Primary election results: Samuelson 61%, Smylie 39% → wikipedia.org [10] Smylie carried only seven of forty-four counties: Nez Perce, Latah, Idaho, Lewis, and Clearwater in north-central Idaho, plus Bannock and Power in eastern Idaho — the state's most educated enclaves, home to the University of Idaho, Lewis-Clark State College, and Idaho State University. lmtribune.com Lewiston Morning Tribune Bill Hall Obituary Editorial (2004) Names all seven counties Smylie carried in the 1966 primary → lmtribune.com [3] The geographic pattern suggests the primary was as much an ideological purge as a tax revolt: Smylie's education constituency remained loyal but was hopelessly outnumbered.

In his 1982 oral history, Smylie reflected with characteristic bluntness: "I'd alienated a lot of what was then a much stronger right wing of the party." He recognized, too late, that his agenda's completion was itself a signal: "The agenda was complete at the end of the sixty-five session... it had probably been about long enough. But the fact that the agenda was complete there was a message there that I didn't read." byui.edu BYU-Idaho Library Robert Smylie Oral History (1982) Primary source: Smylie's own account of his defeat, recorded in 1982 interview → byui.edu [11]

TIME noted the irony: one of Smylie's duties as chairman of the Republican Governors was "to advise other candidates about how to campaign." time.com TIME Magazine "Idaho: An Ironic Defeat" (1966) Notes irony that Smylie's official role was advising candidates on campaigns → time.com [1]

The November Vindication

Three months later, on November 8, 1966, Idaho voters confronted Referendum 1: approval or rejection of the 3% sales tax Smylie had signed into law. The general election had been reshaped by tragedy — Democratic nominee Charles Herndon died in a plane crash on September 14, and Cecil Andrus, the primary runner-up, replaced him. wikipedia.org Wikipedia 1966 Idaho Gubernatorial Election Documents Herndon's death and Andrus's replacement on the Democratic ticket → wikipedia.org [10] Both Samuelson and Andrus opposed the sales tax during the campaign — meaning both major party gubernatorial candidates ran against the very tax voters would decide on the same ballot.

The referendum asked voters to approve "a bill enacted by the 1965 legislature that provided for a 3% excise tax on the sale, storage or use of tangible personal property." ballotpedia.org Ballotpedia Idaho State Sales Tax, Referendum 1 (1966) Official referendum language and results from Idaho Secretary of State → ballotpedia.org [12] The result:

YES: 156,109 (61.18%). NO: 99,048 (38.82%). ballotpedia.org Ballotpedia Idaho State Sales Tax, Referendum 1 (1966) Official vote totals sourced from Idaho Secretary of State returns → ballotpedia.org [12] The same Idaho electorate that destroyed the architect of the sales tax embraced the tax itself by the same supermajority. They fired the cook but kept the recipe.

Samuelson won the governorship with only 41.4% in a four-way race. Two independent candidates captured over 54,000 votes combined, reflecting widespread dissatisfaction with both parties. wikipedia.org Wikipedia 1966 Idaho Gubernatorial Election General election results: Samuelson won with 41.4% in a four-way race → wikipedia.org [10] Yet the sales tax — opposed by both the Republican and Democratic nominees — won in a landslide.

Former Idaho Attorney General David Leroy would later observe that "the votes that elected Samuelson were almost entirely anti-Smylie votes." eastidahonews.com East Idaho News "Remembering Two of Idaho's Most Decisive Elections" (2025) Historian David Leroy's assessment of the anti-Smylie character of the primary → eastidahonews.com [6] Voters had performed a sophisticated act of political surgery: punishing the reformer for accumulated grievances — the tax, the Goldwater opposition, the twelve-year tenure, the personal style — while acknowledging the fiscal reality that Idaho needed the sales tax for education.

Historian Bill Hall wrote in Smylie's 2004 obituary: "Bob Smylie liberated Idaho education from the depths of a financial shortfall in the 1960s. Smylie was the king of deeds when it came to education." lmtribune.com Lewiston Morning Tribune "Bob Smylie Really Was the Education Governor" (2004) Bill Hall editorial confirming Smylie's education legacy → lmtribune.com [3]

The Samuelson Valve

The most structurally significant outcome of 1966 was what happened next — or rather, what didn't happen.

Don Samuelson, who had defeated Smylie by running against the sales tax and won the governorship while voters approved that same tax, governed from 1967 to 1971. During those four years, he made no effort to repeal or significantly modify the sales tax. Not one legislative proposal to rescind it. Not one serious attempt to reduce the rate. wikipedia.org Wikipedia Don Samuelson Governorship section confirms no sales tax repeal or modification during 1967–1971 → wikipedia.org [13]

More extraordinary still: in 1970, four years into governing with the sales tax fully operational, Samuelson "campaigned largely on his record as a fiscal conservative" and still "opposed instituting a state sales tax." wikipedia.org Wikipedia 1970 Idaho Gubernatorial Election Confirms Samuelson continued opposing "a state sales tax" rhetorically in his 1970 re-election campaign → wikipedia.org [14] He governed with the tax for four years while rhetorically opposing it for four years. The doublespeak was the mechanism: campaign forever against a tax you govern with forever.

Cecil Andrus, who defeated Samuelson in 1970 to begin twenty-four consecutive years of Democratic governors, reportedly reflected: "Don't say anything bad about Don Samuelson. If there hadn't been a Don Samuelson there never would have been a Cecil Andrus." manythingsconsidered.com Many Things Considered (Rick Just) "Idaho's Deja Vu" (2013) Secondary source for Andrus's quote about Samuelson's role in enabling Democratic dominance → manythingsconsidered.com [8] The Republican civil war of 1966 never healed in time to prevent a generation of Democratic governors. Yet the sales tax — the issue that supposedly animated that civil war — persisted through every administration.

The Silent Deterrent

Does Smylie's fate shape how subsequent Idaho governors approach tax reform? If so, how — through explicit cautionary tales, or through the silent arithmetic of political survival?

Extensive research found no explicit references to Smylie's fate in subsequent gubernatorial communications about tax policy. Governor Butch Otter's 2017 veto of HB 67a, which would have eliminated the grocery tax, mentioned "$80 million out of the general fund" and asked how the revenue gap would be filled — but never mentioned Smylie. idahoednews.org Idaho Education News "Despite Implications for K-12, Otter Stops Short of Vetoing Highway Bill" (2017) Confirms Otter's veto rationale: $80M general fund impact, education funding concerns → idahoednews.org [15] Governor Brad Little approved over $400 million in tax cuts while expressing concern about sustainability — "I just don't think most Idahoans think we ought to bet on being the fastest growing state forever" — but never invoked Smylie's name. idahocapitalsun.com Idaho Capital Sun "Idaho Gov. Little Says State Can Afford $400M in Tax Cuts" (2025) Little's fiscal caution alongside $400M tax cuts and $6 billion in six-year cumulative cuts → idahocapitalsun.com [16]

The only explicit invocation found was a 2022 Lewiston Tribune analysis by David Leroy comparing Brad Little's primary challenge from Lieutenant Governor Janice McGeachin to the Smylie-Samuelson race: "Fifty-six years ago, the names were Bob Smylie, Don Samuelson and Barry Goldwater. If history were to repeat, incumbent Gov. Little would be losing sleep." lmtribune.com Lewiston Morning Tribune David Leroy Op-Ed: "Is This Primary Idaho's Deja Vu?" (2022) Former Idaho AG explicitly compares Little-McGeachin to Smylie-Samuelson → lmtribune.com [9] But that was a political commentator drawing historical parallels — not a governor citing Smylie to justify a policy choice. The silence from governors themselves is the finding.

Consider the behavioral evidence: In 2006, Lieutenant Governor Brad Little voted for HB 1, which shifted property taxes to sales taxes, despite private concerns — later saying "We were going to have a property tax revolt." idahoednews.org Idaho Education News Coverage of Little's 2006 HB 1 vote Little explains his property tax revolt concern motivating support for the tax shift → idahoednews.org [15] In 2017, Otter vetoed eliminating the grocery tax credit despite overwhelming legislative support — Senate 25-10, House 51-19. In 2025, Little signed $400 million in tax cuts while expressing concern about sustainability, and lawmakers who had cut $6 billion in taxes over six years still couldn't eliminate the grocery tax through normal legislative channels. Each governor threads the needle between electoral popularity and fiscal caution, never citing Smylie but behaving exactly as if they had internalized his lesson.

The National Context

The Smylie-Samuelson race was not an Idaho anomaly but a bellwether for a national conservative realignment. In the 1966 midterms, Republicans gained 47 House seats, 3 Senate seats, 8 governorships, and 557 state legislative seats — a recovery from Goldwater's 1964 catastrophe that reshaped American politics for decades. ashbrook.org Ashbrook Center "1966 Midterm Foreshadows Republican Era" Analysis of 1966 Republican gains: 47 House, 3 Senate, 8 governorships, 557 state legislative seats → ashbrook.org [17] Idaho, which had given Lyndon Johnson 50.92% in 1964 — the last time a Democrat would carry the state in a presidential race — was realigning rightward at the grassroots even as it gave Johnson his margin. wikipedia.org Wikipedia 1964 United States Presidential Election in Idaho Confirms Johnson's 50.92% — last Democratic presidential win in Idaho → wikipedia.org [18]

The Smylie primary tested whether the conservative insurgency could defeat moderate establishment Republicans in their own states. The answer — a crushing 61-39 defeat for a popular three-term governor — sent a clear signal: the moderate, Rockefeller-aligned wing of the party was losing control.

The Sixty-Year Echo

In 2025, sixty years after Smylie navigated the sales tax through the Idaho Senate, the tax's persistence was provoking a new kind of challenge. A citizen initiative led by Howard Rynearson, chairman of the Payette County Republicans, was gathering signatures to place grocery tax repeal on the November 2026 ballot — bypassing the legislature entirely. A group of Republican lawmakers called the "Gang of Eight" joined the effort, publicly collecting signatures in their districts. Polling showed approximately 87% of Idaho voters favored eliminating the grocery tax.

The initiative's existence is itself a systems signature. Sixty years after voters approved the sales tax with 61%, the legislature still cannot or will not eliminate one component of it — the grocery tax — despite near-unanimous public support. The path from Smylie's sales tax to the 2026 ballot initiative runs directly through the structural deterrent this chapter documents: no governor has championed grocery tax elimination as a personal cause, because the incentive structure punishes that kind of leadership. The initiative represents citizens routing around the very deterrent that Smylie's defeat installed.

Conclusion: Firing the Cook, Keeping the Recipe

Smylie was right on the policy. Idaho desperately needed fiscal modernization. The sales tax became "the most important legislative act of Idaho's (first) 100 years," creating the foundation for six decades of balanced budgets and stable government. Voters themselves acknowledged this by approving it in a landslide.

But Smylie was destroyed anyway — not despite his success, but because of how he achieved it: by making voters pay for necessary services while simultaneously antagonizing the ideological movement that was seizing control of his party. The Goldwater opposition provided organizational infrastructure for his defeat; the sales tax provided the popular grievance. Neither alone would have been sufficient. Together they were overwhelming.

The result was a structural deterrent encoded into Idaho's political DNA. Governors who champion tax reform get destroyed. Governors who avoid it survive. The lesson requires no narrator and no memory. It is written into the incentive structure of Idaho elections, where it has shaped gubernatorial behavior from Samuelson's silent maintenance of the tax through Otter's 2017 veto and Little's cautious fiscal threading. The system punishes the reformer regardless of policy success — a system that punishes exactly the behavior it should reward — and that punishment is the price of every reform that follows.